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Introduction
Since the early stages of the nuclear age, visual symbols have played a key role in the
confrontation  between  industry  and  protesters.  From the  cooling  towers  of  nuclear
power plants to the protest movements’ peace and radioactivity logos, actors’ attempts at
encapsulating their stances in visual symbols have turned them into potent icons. Portelli
has recently described these icons as “cultural objects” that should not be analysed “as
independent and decontextualized entities” but “through the prism of the history of aesthetic
representations.”1 Interestingly enough, it was precisely when the iconic cooling towers
were, in the 1960s, starting to be embedded as familiar sights in the British countryside,
that a culture of protest emerged and gained momentum and media visibility . Visual
objects thus became a key ingredient in what was becoming not only a battle of ideas, but
also a battle of representations.  At the heart of this confrontation stood the need to
influence the general public’s representations of the environmental risks linked to the
civilian applications of atomic energy. Approaching these cultural objects helps explore
the  dynamic,  non-linear  influence  of  the  links  between  the  object,  its  means  of
production  and  possible  reception.2 Similarly,  Wise  has  argued  that  visual
representations constitute an essential facet of “materialised epistemology.”3 
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Britain’s  nuclear power venture started in the 1950s.  The first  British nuclear power
programme  was  officially  launched  in  1956,  when  four  Magnox  reactors  became
operational  at  the  Calder  Hall  power  station.  Given their  highly  dangerous  primary
material  and their close links with the British deterrence programme, nuclear power
stations straightaway fell under the authority of the British cabinet. All early nuclear
decisions were shrouded in secrecy, away from not only public but also parliamentary
oversight and scrutiny.4 Consequently, nuclear discourses were institutionally controlled
from the outset. The 1950s came to be characterised by strong civilian deference and
support  for  institutional  discourses5 as  this  unchecked  and  unaccountable  decision-
making  process  was  hardly  ever  met  with  public  counter-discourses  or  opposition.
According to Hogg, the foundations of the “British nuclear state” can be traced back to that
period.  Characterised by the notions of “mystery,  potency,  secrecy,  and entelechy”6 the ‘
British nuclear state’ thus relied on institutional, organisational but also discursive and
communication hegemony. Yet, public deference substantially frayed under the impacts
of two major events, the Windscale (1957)7 and Three Mile Island (1979) accidents, which
gave credence and visibility to the dramatic consequences of severe nuclear incidents.
These  two events  contributed  to  forging  more  nuanced perceptions  of  technological
activities and their potential environmental risks. 
However, it is often noted that opinion polls around nuclear sites reveal a certain support
from the local communities. Drawing on a sociological survey carried out in the Cumbrian
region, Brian Wynne argued nevertheless that such facts were not to be seen as evidence
of public support for nuclear activities, but as symptomatic of their fatalistic acceptance
of  risks.  Wynne  identified  an  unconscious state  of  denial  that  meant  that  these
individuals had buried their risk-related fears under a thick veneer of institutionally-
driven rationality which lies at the heart of British nuclear communication.8 Analysing
TV footage may help investigate this avenue. 
Television allows to analyse institutional, discursive and communication hegemony at the
same time. Drawing on the categories defined by Peters,9 there exist three major groups
of images: first artistic images, second substitute images, aimed at subrogating reality in
order to create emotions,  and finally documentary images,  meant to serve reality and
therefore create knowledge. Given their essentially informative content, TV footage on
nuclear power fall into the latter category. As these short sequences were commissioned
or  sponsored  by either  the  nuclear  industry  (UKAEA  or  CEGB)  or  the  political
establishment via the Central Office for Communication (COI),10 it would not be a stretch
to  argue  that  this  reality  was  filtered  through  an  institutional  point  of  view,  here
distancing the BBC or regional television from their presumably restrained impartiality of
broadcasting. This reality is “a selected perspective presented in a highly structured or filtered
way”.11 In that sense, TV footage of the time helped anchor ideas in this reality, while
making them present/visible. TV footage gave the viewers the illusion of witnessing the
events,  and  of  not  being  fed  with  a reporter’s  second-hand  account. Visual
communication  can also  be  construed  as  a  carefully-crafted  rhetorical  exercise  that
creates  meaning  through  argumentation  and  demonstration.  TV  footage  allows
communicators to explore another way of telling.12 In short, analysing TV footage opens a
window on nuclear discourses and how meaning is expressed. They not only reveal how
institutions communicated on nuclear power activities and their risks, but also how their
discourses  were  altered,  influenced by  changes  in  context,  either  in  terms of  public
opinion or clear opposition from anti-hegemonic groups. Television coverage helps to
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decode  the  nuclear  venture  as  not only  a  technical  but  also  an  ideological  project,
through what Jasanoff and Kim labelled “sociotechnical imageries”. These sociotechnical
imageries refer to “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the
design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” determined by
official or institutional actors.13 The following corpus was gathered through four sets of
online archives:14
release TV footage TITLE length
Nuclear  sites  construction  dates
(completion date)
1956
First commercial nuclear power
station
3’21
Berkeley (1962)
1st PROGRAMME
(MAGNOX)
1956 Atomic Achievement 4’28
1956
How  nuclear  power  works:
Nuclear  Power  Station  Atomic
Achievements
19’15
1957 Atomic Milk 1’25
Bradwell  +  Hunterston  A  +
Hinkley Point A (1962, 1964,
1965)
1959 Reactor on Tow: Bradwell 1’00 Trawsfynydd (1965)
1959
Scotland’s  nuclear  power
station
4’42  
1961
The  Berkeley  Nuclear  power
station
5’00
Sizewell  A  +  Oldbury:
(1966-1968) 
1962 Atomic Power station 3’36
 1962 Bradwell Atomic Power Station 200 
1962 Berkeley Power Station 2’52
1963 Windscale Atomic Factory 7’06 Wylfa (1971)
1965
Wylfa  Nuclear  power  station
under construction
5’48 Dungeness B (AGR) (1983)
2nd
PROGRAMME
(AGR)
1966 Bradwell Power Station 3’08
 
1966 Power accepts Challenge 1’12
1966 This is Bradwell 14’31
1966 Bradwell Power Station 3’08
1967
 
Hinkley Pt B + Hunterston B
(1976)
1968 Hartlepool (1983)
1969 Heysham (1983)
1975
Negotiations  started  to
build Sizewell B 
3rd PRGRAMME
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1980 Look East 3’33 Heysham II + Torness (1988)
1982 Opportunity at Sizewell 21’41  
1987  Sizewell B (1985)
This analysis aims at looking into the long-term evolution of the visual representation of
nuclear-related  environmental  risks.  This  time  frame  focusses  on  the  ‘infancy’  and
‘teenage  years’  of  the  industry,  which  are  crucial  moments  that  were  to  serve  as
templates for the industry’s subsequent communication strategies. 
The  aim  is  therefore  to  determine  how  these  environmental  risks  are  defined,
characterised  and  challenged  in  these  discourses.  Defining  risks  linked  to  nuclear
activities is complex. Nuclear risks are not limited to the physical and health safety of
workers or neighbours, but also include the community’s environment.15 Nuclear risks
encompass  multi-faceted  issues,  which  are  likely  to  lead  to  conflicting  definitions,
especially given their essentially invisible nature. From radiation to contamination or
pollution, it is by essence difficult to see and comprehend nuclear environmental risks, as
they remain impossible to detect or perceive with human senses.  In risk acceptance,
visibility stands as one of the most crucial challenges to overcome.16 
 
Recurring semiotic patterns (1956-1982)
The vision of the machines and power
All the TV documentaries studied draw on the evocative power of visual imagery to stress
the power and inevitability of the nuclear technology. They also fall in line with the then-
prevailing  rhetoric  of  progress  and  modernity,  characteristic  of  the  nuclear
establishment of the time. Most documentaries still draw on popular fascination with the
alien  and  distant  nuclear  venture.  Yet,  if  most  TV  spots  commend  science  and  its
practitioners, the locus of attention here shifted from fundamental to applied research,
staging no longer physicists or researchers, but engineers, as illustrated by the following
examples with control rooms and rods: 
 
How Nuclear Power Works (1956)
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Scotland’s first nuclear power station (1959)
 
The “Press-Button Age’’ in BBC Look at Life series (1961)
 
Berkeley Power Station (1962)
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Atomic Power Station (1962)
 
Atomic Power Station (1962)
 
This is Bradwell (1966)
 
Bradwell Power Station (1966)
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Opportunity at Sizewell (1982)
These different images provide a very sleek and almost clinical representation of the
insides of the nuclear power stations. The viewers are undoubtedly struck by the strongly
aesthetic visual, with machines radiating control and command, while the outside shots
strengthen the towering yet harmonious effect of the exterior buildings. Even though
these screen captures span more than three decades,  they depict  very similar  visual
symbols which tap into the same iconographic register: nuclear artefacts or props, such
as fuel cartridges, measurement screens, and white lab coats, or places, including the
easily-recognisable control  rooms.  Such focus on artefacts and visual  nuclear truisms
hints  at  revealing  /  objectifying  and  making  this  esoteric  scientific  practice  and  its
founding component – the nuclear reaction - visible and material. 
However, most documentaries do not only represent and bring the machines and the
technical apparatus into the foreground. These instruments are indeed never represented
as  functioning  independently.  Around  them,  operators  manoeuvre  calmly  and
composedly, manipulating levels, turning sliders, pushing buttons, perusing gauges, or
handling  them with  control  and  intent.  Such  staging stands  out  when compared  to
images  found in expert  journals  for  instance,  which tended to  only  represent  iconic
objects, as illustrated by the photos used for the Engineer article on Calder Hall published
on 5 October 1956 (see S.10).
Overall, a constant feature that emerges is the strength of the control and mastery of the
machines by men - here engineers and operators. The stereotypical representation of the
scientists  in  white  lab  coats  is  here  again perpetuated.  Between 1957 and 1982,  this
scenography, including camera angles and shots, hardly changed, thereby participating
in the prevailing quasi-sacralised depiction of the nuclear technicians in action. 
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Two control rod actuating mechanisms (1956).
 
Rationalising and popularising discourses on nuclear practices and
risks
Several sections of the TV footage materials are silent. Their purpose is not necessarily to
explain, but to show, to let the public enter the premises, and see what a nuclear power
station looks like from the inside – to see science in action. They constitute as many
attempts  at  popularising science by resorting to traditional  rhetorical  strategies.  For
instance, jargon and specialised terms are never used, even when going into technical
procedures.  The prime popularising process  is  based on using schoolbook-like  visual
representation of scientific processes for the structure of atoms, of nuclear reactions, or
of the cooling circuit,  for instance.17 However,  the environmental risks of pollution /
radiation  are  never  depicted  in  these  visual  materials,  except  the  radiation  emitted
during the controlled nuclear reaction inside the reactor. These radiation waves are most
of the time depicted in an unaggressive light-blue glow (1966 TV footage). These visual,
educational materials are used to explain and educate viewers on nuclear matters. Such a
pedagogical approach is coupled with the unescapable presence of the semantic fields of
rationality, reliability and necessity. 
Over  the whole  period,  the public  remained considered as  a  group of  irrational  and
emotional beings, likely to be easily influenced by set ideas or counter-arguments based
on fears and anti-innovation rhetoric.  It  then follows that if  citizens did not support
nuclear power, it was because they did not understand it. Labelled the ‘knowledge-deficit
model’, this vision of the public’s lack of scientific understanding justified these attempts
at popularising nuclear activity. Even the presenter from the 1982 documentary argues
that  once  the  public  understands  the  “facts”,  they  would  support  the  controversial
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Sizewell  PWR  project.  Journalist  Peter  Fairley  argues  that  he  himself  is  “personally
convinced of their case. Yet it’s a complex matter so the CEGB is anxious that everybody should
understand the facts. That’s why this film has been made.” 
Lumped together, these characteristics conjure up the main features of a technocentric
system.  Techno-centrism  is  characterised  by  a  belief  in  rationality,  linked  to  an
unbounded faith in human capacities, coupled with a strong admiration for the scientific
feats which enabled scientists to develop techniques and increase material wealth. Its
presence in these visual institutional discourses evokes what Johnson defines as “manifest
rationality.”18 
Consequently,  environmental  risks  stand  at  the  crossroads  between  these  two
communication strategies that at first sight seem incompatible, with on the one hand, a
sacralising  of  scientific  practices,  and  on  the  other,  a  trivialising  of  civilian  nuclear
activities.  This  recurrent  hybrid  approach  allowed  communicators  to  somehow
popularise  nuclear  science,  while  simultaneously  securing  a  hierarchy  between  the
science world and the public. In other words, most of the footage studied hints at the
existence of regular symbiotic patterns, or recurring “knowledge, imagery, and artefacts of
applied nuclear physics”, that characterise the “British nuclear culture.”19 We can therefore
go further and argue that this nuclear culture is underpinned by a famous “technocratic
pose” or vision of nuclear activities, based on “a stance that rhetorically places technological
activity above and beyond the sphere of politics and reach of politicians.”20 Advertising science
through a controlled presentation of scientific practices aimed at guaranteeing public
acceptance. A technocratic system revolves on the notion that rationality stands as the
bedrock for public policymaking and political choices. It follows that civil society, along
with political actors and other stakeholders, are expected to assume a deferential attitude
regarding  recognised  expertise.21 Such  technocratic  ethos  undoubtedly  underpinned
most of the TV footage studied. 
To a certain extent, TV acted as an echo chamber for institutional communication which
lifted the lid on nuclear activities on TV and allowed viewers to literally enter the nuclear
sites  thanks  to  the  camerawork.  Did  abstract  and  immaterial  environmental  risks
undergo a similar treatment? 
 
First nuclear programme (1957-1965): The Nuclear
State in action
Using television as a prime vehicle for nuclear communication conveniently took science
out  of  museums.  Over  the  period  studied,  television entered  a  period  of  formidable
expansion. As opposed to museums, exhibitions or specialised journals, the small screen
then surfaced as a powerful communication tool to disseminate information. As the very
first mass media, television stood as a much more democratic, powerful, albeit passive,
tool to reach as many recipients as possible.22 
 
Harnessed progress and national pride 
TV here plays the role of a primary didactic vector, used as an institutional instrument to
strengthen  Britain’s  national  identity  and  pride  in  its  industrial  and  engineering
capacities. Britain is construed as ready to rule the electrical waves. Just as nuclear bombs
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played a critical role in defining British cultural and geopolitical identity during the Cold
War,23 its civilian counterpart followed a similar path in the economic sector, forging the
image of a new industrial leader. Britain’s role at the vanguard of the global commercial
nuclear venture is often stressed. In 1966, Britain for instance already had “a very long lead
in th[e nuclear] field in the rest of the world” (Power Accepts Progress, 1966). In the mute 1961
TV footage of  Berkeley nuclear power station, the use of  cranes to shoot high angle
panning shots of the buildings further underscored the size of the structure. As claimed
in the 1962 Atomic Power Station footage, these buildings provide “a glimpse of the future”.
This unremitting atmosphere of optimism and pride in nuclear technologies through its
buildings is sustained by the formidably epic movie tones used as background music in
the Reactor on Tow: Bradwell (1959), the Atomic Power Station (1962), or the ‘Press-Button Age’
footage (1961) – all worthy of the most iconic Hollywood film soundtracks of the 1950s.
All in all, most TV footage shot between 1956 and 1966 conveyed the overall Whiggish
rhetoric  of  technological  and  industrial  progress.  Against  the  backdrop  of  this
communication strategy however, the Windscale accident came as a clap of thunder in a
clear British sky.
 
Environmental risks: the impact of the Windscale Accident 
Among the examples studied, the 1956 footage - therefore before the Windscale accident -
is the only one which explicitly represents workers wearing airtight protective gear and
respirators, as illustrated in the following screenshot. Such an image would not appear
again in the subsequent footage. 
Atomic Achievements (1956)
Windscale provided material  evidence that risk control  was not absolute.  Despite the
prevailing rhetoric of confidence, control and reassurance, the issue of contamination
was nonetheless indirectly broached. In the wake of the radioactive leakage, the milk
from 200 square miles of farmland around the plant was condemned as radioactive. Yet,
in the 1957 Atomic Milk footage, the serious nature of radioactivity is undermined through
humorous comments. For instance, the broadcaster claimed that the managing engineer
could not “kiss his wife for 4 days,” while discussions on the long-term environmental risks
were simply eluded since “you can’t explain radioactivity to a cow”. 
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After 1957, TV material was visibly altered as if to pre-empt a potential rise in popular
anxieties.  The clinical  representation of the machines functions here as syllogisms to
stymie the potential emergence of anti-nuclear protest. The 1961 Press-Button Age footage
goes even as far  as  shooting a nuclear operative handling highly-dangerous material
labelled with the iconic radioactive pictogram, while the voice-over defiantly claims that
this man has “the simplest and safest of jobs” of handling bulk uranium.
 
The ‘Press-Button Age (1961)
The radioactive pictogram was glaringly absent from previous footage. This visual code
for nuclear risk was thus claimed from anti-nuclear protesters and dragged back into the
institutional visual rhetorical arsenal. This footage refers once to “stringent precautions”,
but these safeguards are less intended to protect the staff, than to protect “the reactor
from  the  outside  world”  –  thus  operating  an  interesting  reversal  in  the  victim/threat
dynamic. Such a description rather stands apart from the 1956 footage. 
All  in all,  the documentary footage from the first  nuclear programme still  tended to
reveal the discursive power of the nuclear state in countering the politics of potential and
harmful vulnerability24 of nuclear facilities. Between 1956 and 1966, TV nuclear footage
remained  rather  homogenous  in  the  way  it  broached  nuclear  power  activities  and
explored - or did not explore - its environmental risks. Apart from the instances cited,
very  little  visibility  was  given  to  environmental  risks  -  quite  the  opposite.  Several
documentaries show shots of cattle peacefully grazing around electricity pylons, with the
iconic cooling towers in the background of this almost Arcadian view. Such shots may
convey the idea that nuclear activity has no disruptive force regarding the environment
and should therefore not be opposed to nature protection and conservation. As Jolivette
underlines,  “nature  and nuclear  are  read not  as  polarised opposites  but  part  of  a  common,
historically specific culture in which the visual forms, rather merely reflects the discourses of the
age.”25 The outset of the second nuclear programme however, was marked by a distinct
shift in communication paradigm on environmental risks. 
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The second nuclear programme (1966-1982):
environmental risks as battleground
Making risks visible through unveiling strategies and linguistic
cleansing 
The 1966 documentary follows a group of tourists composed of both men and women as
they visit Bradwell nuclear power station. The footage starts with an aerial view of a bus
driving along small, winding roads in the countryside. In the background, a light-hearted
soundtrack  accompanies  this  group.  Straight  from  the  beginning,  this  documentary
sounds both light in tone and entertaining. 
Moreover, the second nuclear programme TV footage seem less intended to fully explain
the workings of nuclear reactions and energy production, than to “domesticate”26 the atom
- to make it enter everyday life. Hence, numerous metaphors or comparisons to everyday
life or known items or practices are drawn to divert attention towards visible and familiar
dangers, to trivialise nuclear risks. In many instances, sophisticated nuclear activity is
presented as harmless and benign.27 For instance, Raymond Baxter, the TV presenter of
the 1966 documentary, claims that “working at a nuclear power station is a lot safer than
crossing Piccadilly”, since “nothing is left to chance.”28 He echoes and upholds the prevailing
visual imagery of control and command previously identified and the industry safety
record  that  here  presumably  ward  off  any  potential  accidental  radiation  or
contamination on site. Words such as “harmless”, “nothing mysterious”, “perfectly safe” are
repeated as an enchanting leitmotiv to hammer in the viewers’ minds that in a power
station, “everything is controlled.” 
Similarly, the environmental risks of pollution and radiation of the vicinity are addressed
more explicitly. The 1966 footage extensively dwells on shooting operatives measuring
the ‘natural radioactivity’ of the fauna and flora around Bradwell. However, the actual
environmental  and  health  risks  linked  to  radioactivity  –  contamination,  pollution,
radiation – are never explicitly mentioned as such. Why? Because close monitoring allows
to pre-emptively manage them, hence making these risks twice invisible. These risks are
only visually referred to through the measurement instruments, and the sample-taking
routine presumably daily performed by the operators. The way environmental risks are
dealt with sketches out a certain definition of ‘risks’, that leans towards ‘hazards’, rather
than ‘risks’. Hazards can be understood as easily identifiable and predictable, while ‘risk’
entails a polysemous and ambiguous notion, probabilistic and yet less predetermined, and
whose  potential  consequences  are  less  easy  to  identify.  All  in  all,  such  visual
representations were construed as essential to endow the invisible with substance. 
When the second nuclear programme was launched, advertising and communicating on
environmental risks helped guarantee support and acceptance, not necessarily from the
whole population, but more importantly from the local communities. Tony Shaw depicted
the 1960s’ BBC as “an official publicity arm” for the nuclear industry, as it would regularly
broadcast short films on nuclear power material which “had something of a tranquilising
effect” on the British population.29 These institutional discourses were thus tailored to
respond to  rising concerns  over  potential  nuclear-induced environmental  and health
effects  and  hinder  the  development  of  counter-discourses.30 This  approach  indeed
coincided  with  the  rise  in  a  new culture  of  protest,  especially  among  students  and
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intellectuals against large-scale industrial complexes as a whole. At the turn of the 1970s,
this  rise  in  tensions  regarding  the  environmental  consequences  of  capitalist  and
industrial activities participated in bringing environmental questions and risks onto the
political agenda: in 1969 the newspaper the Ecologist was founded; the Department for the
Environment was set up in 1970. The first Friends of the Earth UK group, then specifically
opposed to nuclear power, was also established in 1971. 
At the turn of the 1970s, these environmental groups primarily focussed on the radiation
and  contamination  risks  incurred  when  dealing  with  dangerous  materials.  The
government  then  attempted  to  provide  political  safeguards  to  deflate  growing
environmental anxiety. In 1970 the Heath Government notably introduced new radiation
legislation,  one of  the most  critical  of  its  kind.  The 1970 Radiological  Protection Act
established  a  new  public  authority,  the  National  Radiological  Protection  Board,
overtaking and expanding powers and responsibilities previously vested in the UKAEA
Health and Safety Branch.  Welcomed by the scientific  community,  this  initiative was
further hastened by the rise in the levels of long-lived atmospheric radioactivity for the
first time in several years. According to the New Scientist newspaper, “the creation of this
new entity provide[d] an ideal opportunity to close the existing gap in understanding between the
nuclear industry and the public.”31 Mostly providing guidelines and advice, this institution
played a major role in defending the idea of relative nuclear radiation, to set the threshold
under which the levels of ionising radiations remained a minimal acceptable risk for both
citizens and the environment. 
 
The Sizewell B case: upping the ante in communication strategy on
environmental risks
The communication strategy in the 1982 Sizewell footage differs from the other instances
as environmental risks are explicitly identified and broached. However, even though they
are mentioned, it is via the use of negative phrases: “there’s been no nuclear accidents at
Sizewell,  no  contamination with radioactive  materials  outside  the  power  station area,  and no
serious  exposure  of  any  member  of  staff.”32 In  a  performative  fashion,  institutional
communication no longer hinges on covering or eluding environmental risks, but rather
on  publicising  their  absence,  thus  breathing  new  life  in  the  control  rhetoric.
Environmental  risks  are  here  addressed  following  a  mentioning-erasing  dynamic,
illustrating  what  Halary  and  Couégnas  identify  as  the  “smoothening-out”  strategy.33
However, this transparency policy remains cosmetic, since certain plant areas remain out
of reach to visitors. According to the presenter of the 1980 documentary, only practical
reasons prevent visitors from for instance accessing the cooling pools:
There’s nothing dangerous, nothing secret about a nuclear power station, there’s
nowhere in the working areas that you can’t go to, and by prior arrangement a
visitor with a specialised interest can see anything. But in practice there are many
places which are uncomfortable or inconvenient for a large party.
Farley argues that visiting the cooling ponds would entail wearing protection gear and
watertight boots, not to be protected from the radioactive cooling water, but to avoid
getting wet. Overall, communication on nuclear-linked environmental risks created the
mirage of sharing knowledge and information on safety issues and environmental risk,
while still entrenching distance between the information provided and the viewers. Once
again, public acceptance emerged as a fundamental prerequisite for technological and
nuclear expansion, forestalling potential stalemates in the subsequent public inquiries on
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potentially  future  nuclear  sites.  Anti-nuclear  movements  indeed  tended  to  be  more
successful at mustering popular support in the sites earmarked for future construction, as
was the case in Scotland or Cornwall in the early 1980s. 
This shift in risk communication strategy may have been triggered by both domestic and
international factors. At home and for many environmental groups, the 1970s coincided
with a  shift  in  focus  from the  military  to  the  commercial  dimension of  the  nuclear
programme, transferring activist practices including marches and sit-ins along with it.
Although anti-nuclear power movements never attracted as much media coverage and
visibility as CND did, they partook in the rise of a broader and more politically-driven
environmentalism34. Internationally speaking, the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the
US gave nuclear risks a visual reality. The accident also led to re-forging the previous
risk-numbing  process  of  the  1960s’  visual  and  linguistic  rhetoric.  Dealing  with  the
emotional impact of Three Mile Island became a priority of the nuclear industry, as the
PWR project at Sizewell was to have the same reactor model as Three Mile Island. 
The 1980 TV footage features an anti-nuclear activist who openly questions the rationale
and guarantees provided by a CEGB representative on the safety of the PWR reactor to be
built at Sizewell. Both interviewees are standing in front of the plant yet from different
angles.  The  unnamed  activist  cuts  a  very  serious-looking  academic  figure,  which
nonetheless  contrasts  with  the  stern  corporate  outfit  sported  by  the  industry
representative.  The  activist  calls  onto  recognised  expertise  from  UK  scientists  and
engineers to make his case: “leading scientists and engineers in the UK – we are not only talking
about US guys – have come out and said that PWRs are inherently less safe than other systems. So
of  course,  I’m  very  worried  about  safety.”  Instead  of  eluding  opposition,  this  footage
therefore  stages  it.  In  that  sense,  the  institutional  strategy  slightly  differs  from
traditional discourses, “identified as being guided by a double structuring principle, combining
stabilised  arguments  and  covered  conflicts.”35 This  staged  confrontation  between  the
protester and nuclear representative helps mitigate the assumed ‘information vacuum’
among the public: here the CEGB representative firmly discards the protester’s safety
fears on the grounds that firstly, the UK industry boasted a stellar safety record, and
secondly that the PWR reactor would be adapted to the British regulatory and technical
standards  –  being technically  not  a  US model  in  practice.  Staging this  indirect  Q&A
between the CEGB representative and the campaigner thus opened a dialogic window to
fight  anti-nuclear  movements  on  their  own  traditional  rhetorical  grounds  since  the
1970s’  environmental  discourses  primarily  contested  nuclear  power’s  alleged  safety
records to denounce nuclear-induced hazards.36 By inviting an anti-nuclear campaigner,
the 1980 TV footage director chose to visually represent and confront the contesting and
anti-hegemonic discourses on the environmental impacts of nuclear activities.  It  thus
reveals the industry tacitly acknowledged the need to confront activists’ perceptions of
risk, which can be understood as ‘‘a culturally-framed concept which acts as a metaphor for
individual feelings about a loss of control, powerlessness and the drift of social change away from
what is good for the Earth towards what seems to be bad.”37 As such, it highlights how risks
then needed to be mediated and their acceptance negotiated. By giving anti-hegemonic
discourses a platform on television, the footage aims at visually staging the superiority of
the industry’s knowledge over that of the public and independent scientists: here the
CEGB representative  boasts  insider  knowledge over  the  technicalities  of  the  Sizewell
project and is the last shown - thus implicitly controlling the closure of the interview in a
somewhat  patronising  fashion.  Openly  confronting  anti-nuclear  discourses  on
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environmental  risks  on  television,  coupled  with  the  overall  shift  in  communication
paradigm, therefore participated in entrenching a technocratic ethos as a pillar of British
nuclear culture.
 
Conclusion
Television is “the story of our times,” providing both liveness and historicity to research.38
Choosing to  depict  –  or  not  –  certain  phenomena  using  images,  icons,  or  linguistic
symbols undoubtedly provides valuable epistemological material to analyse the history of
British nuclear science. This analysis therefore partakes in a general rise in interest in
nuclear power narratives, as illustrated by the special issue of the British Society for the
History of Science on the British Nuclear State.39 This analysis of the way environmental
risks were dealt with on TV helps draw several conclusions. Firstly, environmental risks
are tightly intertwined with the understanding of the capacities and roles of the citizens,
as opposed to official scientific expertise. 
Secondly, communicating on how to manage risks in situ echoed the widespread idea that
citizens needed to understand the activity but not its sanitary consequences.  Nuclear
discourses  still  heavily  relied  on  the  idea  that  citizens  were  emotionally-controlled
individuals, who needed to be educated and reassured to support the nuclear venture.
Nonetheless, the TV coverage of the British expansion came to be much more open about
environmental risks. A strong shift at the beginning of the second nuclear programme
and  the  rise  of  anti-nuclear  protests  entailed  that  environmental  risks  had  to  be
communicated upon, just like the workings of a nuclear reactor during the first nuclear
programme.
In that sense, these changing parameters paved the way for the critical 1985 Bodmer
Report on the Public Understanding of Science (PUS).40 This critical report gave birth to a
movement that would gain strong momentum in both academic and political circles in
the following decade.41 The Bodmer Report  argued that  the population remained too
disconnected from the scientific world, and that scientific knowledge had to be bolstered
for a better understanding of scientific contents, to improve people’s attitude regarding
scientific endeavours. Aimed at cultivating less conflictual relations between science and
the public, the PUS thus turned the vision of science as a Messiah (knowledge-deficit
model) into a vision of science as a missionary (PUS). This shift would act as a catalyst for
many  alterations  in  the  decision-making  process  and  media  treatment  of  science
questions42 until being questioned and abandoned with the 2000 Science New Deal.43 This
PUS movement gained impetus just as the public acceptance of risks became a prime
research topic in Anglophone sociological research.44 
However, this analysis also offers to nuance and rethink the periodisation of the Public
Understanding  of  Science  movement.  In  his  much-reviewed  seminal  work,  Wynne
considers the 1980s as the turning-point in the perception and role of the public, and the
Bodmer Report is often identified as a yardstick in the development of the “knowledge-
deficit model”. As far as environmental risks go, this analysis of TV footage traced the shift
from the deficit model to the PUS back to the late 1960s and the second British nuclear
programme, and not later. Spanning thirty years of institutional communication on the
British  nuclear  venture,  these  TV documentaries  shed  light  on  the  way  the  various
stakeholders harnessed rationality to vie for the public’s interest, acceptance, and trust.
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ABSTRACTS
At the start of the British nuclear programmes, most technological choices were made away from
public  scrutiny  and  behind  closed  doors.  Early  nuclear  decision  making  was  backed  by  the
rationale  that  British  citizens  lacked  technical  and  specialised  knowledge  to  make  informed
decisions  on  nuclear  questions.  The  emergence  of  public  debates  on  nuclear  risks  was  thus
greatly hindered by limited public communication. However, this technocratic decision-making
model came under fire in the wake of the 1957 Windscale accident and the rise of environmental
opposition  throughout  the  1960s.  The  environmental  risks  of  contamination,  pollution,  and
radiation became a source of heightened tension between industry and anti-nuclear activists.
This paper aims at exploring the impact of the rise in public environmental anxiety on state-
sponsored television footage released between the late  1950s  and the early  1980s.  Analysing
television footage helps identify the institutional communication strategies used to negotiate the
British public’s understanding and acceptance of nuclear-induced environmental risks between
1956 and 1982.  This  analysis  suggests  that  the  industry’s  communication approach was  only
cosmetically  altered by this  changing context.  It  contends that,  if  these cultural  productions
participated  in  constructing  a  more  nuanced  depiction  of  nuclear  risks,  they  nonetheless
remained based on the idea that citizen opposition mostly reflected deficiencies  in scientific
literacy. 
Les  premiers  programmes  nucléaires  britanniques  se  sont  caractérisés  par  un  modèle  de
confinement de l’information et d’absence de droit de regard citoyen, légitimé par l’existence
d’un supposé déficit de connaissances des citoyens. Toutefois, l’accident de Windscale de 1957 et
la montée en puissance des mouvements environnementaux au cours des années 1960 portent un
coup sévère à ce processus décisionnel technocratique. La question des risques de contamination,
de  pollution  et  de  radiation  induits  par  les  activités  nucléaires  se  place  alors  au  cœur  des
confrontations entre l’industrie nucléaire et les groupes environnementaux. Cet article analyse
l’impact  de  la  montée  des  préoccupations  environnementales  sur  les  stratégies  de
communication  institutionnelle  autour  des  activités  électronucléaires  britanniques,  telles
qu’elles  émergent  à  travers  les  productions  télévisées  de  l’époque  (1956-1982).  Cette  étude
s’attache à identifier et interpréter les mécanismes de communication visuelle mis en place afin
de restaurer la confiance du public autour des risques nucléaires environnementaux. L’analyse
des mécanismes de communication mobilisés par ces productions culturelles fait alors émerger
une  image  certes  plus  nuancée  des  risques  nucléaires,  mais  celle-ci  demeure  profondément
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ancrée dans une vision technocratique du public britannique, dont les préoccupations seraient
finalement toujours le fruit d’un déficit informationnel. 
INDEX
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